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“My Commission will not be afraid to speak the language 
of confidence. But it will be our way, the European way. 
This is the geopolitical Commission that I have in mind, 
and that Europe urgently needs”, announced 
Commission President von der Leyen in 2019. Although 
nearly every new European Commission has promised to 
improve European Union (EU) external action, none has 
displayed a comparatively strong and early commitment 
as hers. In an increasingly ‘contested’ world, in which 
disinformation techniques are used to undermine the 
European Union’s legitimacy, strategic communication – 
a combination of reactive messaging and proactive 
narrative-building that underpins policy priorities – can 
be considered as the lynchpin of the EU’s new 
geopolitical approach.  
 
This policy brief analyses the EU’s strategic 
communication. It first situates this communication into 
the broader geopolitical rationale and then follows its 
evolution until Covid-19 times. While acknowledging some 
virtues of this policy, it cautions against important 
shortcomings that may endanger EU foreign policy in the 
long run. The current EU approach mainly frames 
disinformation as an external threat stemming from Russia 
but ignores other foreign and domestic actors involved in 
this practice. This stance compromises the EU’s capacity to 
build consensus around its norms and values and neglects 
the role that ‘listening’ practices can have to engage on an 
equal footing with foreign audiences. Against this 
backdrop, the policy brief proposes a set of 
recommendations addressing EU top-level discourse, 
strategic communication practices and broader foreign 
policy actions, with the objective of rethinking the current 
approach and allowing the EU to communicate even more 
strategically. 
 
Geopolitics à l’européenne meets soft power 
Since the establishment of the new Commission, 
‘geopolitics’ has been a hot topic in EU policy circles and 
the media. To respond to external threats, from the 
growing competition between the US and China to the 
instability in its own neighbourhood, the new executive 
has pledged to restore the European Union’s role in the 
world by declaring that geopolitics should become part 
and parcel of the EU’s playbook.  
On the Commission’s agenda, the term ‘geopolitics’ has 
little to do with Rudolf Kjellén’s initial conceptualisation 
that looked at the geographical dimension of power and 
the influence of variables such as climate, territorial 
Executive Summary 
> As part of the European Union’s current 
‘geopolitical turn’, strategic communication – 
combining reactive messaging and proactive 
narrative-building – is a key element of the EU’s 
response to increasing global contestation. 
> Through its reactive component, the EU’s strategic 
communication is very much focussed on Russia, 
but still largely neglects that many other foreign 
and domestic actors deploy disinformation 
techniques, too.  
> With its proactive component, the EU uses 
narrative-building and, in so doing, resorts to 
aggressive ‘othering’ – disregarding the role of 
‘listening’ practices in building trust and mutual 
understanding with third parties. 
> Instead of focussing on Eurocentric and securitising 
narratives, the EU should engage with the world on 
an equal footing in order to communicate even 
more strategically. 
> To this end, a more self-reflexive top-level political 
discourse should be coupled with a holistic and 
joined-up approach to disinformation and a greater 
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configuration, and access to the sea. Beyond 
environmental determinism, the contemporary use of 
geopolitics in the EU seeks instead to emphasise two 
characteristic features of global politics: 1) that power 
matters in international relations, and that this is why 
actors are ready to compete for it; and 2) that the 
structure of international politics matters more than its 
agents. As such, geopolitics à l’européenne seeks to 
acknowledge the existence of global competitors and the 
need to increase the EU’s focus on external action through 
various ways of using power.  
Importantly, the scope of the EU as a geopolitical player is 
not limited to ‘hard’ spheres and material interests and 
threats. Conceptualising contemporary global politics as a 
contested arena places emphasis on the role of ‘soft’ tools 
in international power struggles. From this perspective, for 
instance, Russia’s and China’s sophisticated 
communication campaigns to win public support not only 
among domestic constituencies but also foreign audiences 
could be seen as the continuation of ‘politics’ through 
other means. With its own emphasis on strategic 
communication and narrative-building, the EU tries to 
become a stronger actor on this novel playing field. 
When communication becomes ‘strategic’: EU versus 
external disinformation prior to Covid-19 
The development of an EU policy on strategic 
communication dates to the mid-2010s and the aftermath 
of the Ukraine crisis. Following its annexation of Crimea 
and the support for separatists in eastern Ukraine, Russia 
heavily boosted its investments in a diversified media 
outlet toolbox designed to target foreign audiences. In its 
March 2015 Conclusions, the European Council sought to 
challenge Russia’s actions and reach out to people both 
inside the EU and in its neighbourhood to share the 
European Union’s narratives. The Conclusions called on 
the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy (HR) to, in cooperation with Member States and EU 
institutions, develop an action plan on strategic 
communication and to set up a team for this task.  
The June 2015 Action Plan provided three overall 
objectives: supporting EU policies and values towards the 
Eastern neighbourhood; improving the regional media 
environment; and raising awareness on deceiving 
disinformation activities while improving the EU’s capacity 
to respond. The East StratCom Task Force, a dedicated 
team within the European External Action Service for 
countering Russia’s disinformation campaign, started to 
release regular ‘Disinformation Digests’ and eventually 
‘Reviews’ to debunk fake news, biased news and 
manipulated information from pro-Kremlin media. Among 
its key areas of activity, the Action Plan sought to increase 
public diplomacy initiatives in the neighbourhood and 
engage with local populations (especially young people, 
academia and civil society) in the framework of the 
Partnership Instrument and Erasmus Plus. 
Between 2015 and 2017, two task forces were added: the 
South StratCom Task Force, seeking to respond to the 
propaganda of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and 
the Western Balkans StratCom Task Force, aiming at 
challenging Russia’s activities in the Western Balkans 
region. The 2018 ‘Action Plan Against Disinformation’, a 
Commission and HR Joint Communication, sought to 
further clarify the scope of the EU’s activities and mobilise 
the private sector in the fight against disinformation.  
Defending ‘Europe’: the EU versus disinformation around 
Covid-19 
Following the work of its predecessor, von der Leyen’s 
‘geopolitical Commission’ has given strategic 
communication an even more important place in its 
portfolio. The Commission’s 2020 Work Programme 
sought to counter “multiple challenges, both from outside 
and from within” faced by EU countries’ democratic 
systems in order to improve their resilience in the long 
term (EC, 2020b). In February 2020, HR Borrell argued that 
the EU should “relearn the language of power” and 
combine its “resources in a way that maximizes their 
geopolitical impact” (Borrell, 2020a). However, it is amidst 
the Covid-19 pandemic that the emphasis on strategic 
communication has reached a new momentum. In what 
came to be described as a war-like scenario, on 23 March 
2020, Borrell emphasised the role of narratives: in his 
view, “whoever is best at organising the response, quickly 
drawing on lessons learnt from around the world and 
communicating successfully towards citizens and the 
wider world, will come out strongest” (Borrell, 2020b). The 
HR depicted a world witnessing “a struggle of influence 
through spinning” and urged EU institutions and its 
member states to be “armed with facts” and “defend 
Europe against its detractors” (ibid.).  
The emergence of a more coordinated European response 
came days after several shipments of medical aid had 
landed in the European Union’s territory, mainly from 
Russia, China and Cuba. In what came to be the most 
heavily mediatised campaign, nine Russian military planes 
travelled to Lombardy, Italy, as the country was at the 
forefront of the fight against the virus. Stickers with heart-
shaped Russian and Italian flags and the motto ‘From 
Russia with Love’ were placed on the planes and trucks 
bringing medical military specialists and equipment.  
Well beyond top-level communication, emphasis on 
strategic communication has spread across other levels 
and areas of EU external action. The recent work 
programmes for information outreach on EU external 
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against disinformation and, to this end, a shift towards a 
“storytelling approach with a focus on campaigns, rather 
than showcasing isolated initiatives or projects” (EC, 
2020a). Public and especially cultural diplomacy are thus 
seen as external action tools that help to express more 
effectively the fundamental principles that guide EU 
foreign policy.  
Overall, in what has come to be framed as a “contested 
world” (EU, 2016) to which disinformation contributes, the 
European Union positioned itself as the actor that 
separates facts and opinion, truth and lies, and, in that 
way, stands on the right side of history. 
The limits of the EU’s strategic communication 
In reaction to an altered security environment, the 
emergence of geopolitical thinking in EU foreign policy has 
important virtues. Whereas the EU has long framed itself 
as a cosmopolitan and post-political project, embracing 
geopolitics represents the acknowledgment of an 
‘existential crisis’ and part of a self-reflexive act: the EU 
cannot arrange the world on its own. This realization 
points to the need of enhancing its capacity to recognise 
and respond to existing regional contestations also 
through stronger engagement with foreign audiences.  
Despite this positive turn, several important limits speak 
against the EU’s current approach to strategic 
communication. 
Disinformation is not (only) an external threat 
Any political order requires a shared consensus on its key 
guiding principles in order to function properly. 
Disinformation seeks to dilute this consensus, leading 
some recipients to a problematic agnosticism over 
everything that gets media coverage. The ‘infodemic’ in 
COVID-19 times is the latest example of how over-
abundance of information can harm public health. From 
this perspective, one should welcome the EU’s attempt to 
occupy this policy space and hence adapt to the contested 
world it pledged to confront in the EUGS. 
The problem is thus not targeting disinformation as such, 
but rather the one-sided focus of its current action. Since 
2015, Brussels has in fact framed disinformation as an 
external threat that originates far away from the Union’s 
territory, more precisely in Russia. The foreign nature of 
the threat required the involvement of an actor with an 
external portfolio, namely the EEAS, rather than one 
focusing on the internal dimensions of EU communication 
policy. The emphasis has been, in other words, on the 
‘foreign destabilisation’ while domestic sources of 
disinformation or citizens’ media literacy and 
consumption have received far less attention. Through 
these representations, the Union came to produce the 
image of a ‘self’ that is threatened by a certain ‘other’ and 
that is therefore doomed to debunk false claims and re-
establish the ‘facts’. 
It is through this lens that EU strategic communication can 
be considered a textbook example of ‘securitisation’, a 
move that situates threats beyond the borders of an 
otherwise safe social space. What is questioned here is not 
the threatening essence of Russia’s campaigns, but the 
political decision to locate this threat away from EU ‘safe’ 
borders, thus neglecting domestic sources of 
disinformation. For comparison, the example of the 
United States is telling, where domestic observers 
acknowledged that the most serious threat for US 
democracy came not from some Russia-based troll 
factories, but from the man that sat in the Oval Office for 
four years (see, for instance, Gunitsky, 2020). This 
underscores that no binary opposition between Western-
made truth and non-Western-made lies exists.  
Disinformation is not only a Russia-centred problem 
Russia remains a central actor in contesting the EU norms- 
and values-based order, and any EU strategic 
communication action should take this into consideration 
and respond accordingly. The recent vaccine campaign 
proves to be an excellent case in point. Russian authorities 
have attempted to undermine Western-produced 
vaccines while at the same time betting hazardously on 
Sputnik V, even at a time when its clinical trials remained 
incomplete (Valenza, 2020). Even more interestingly, 
Russia was willing to play the ‘vaccine race’ after years of 
dissemination of anti-vaccine messages. 
Yet, in the middle of the pandemic, disinformation is not 
only a Russia-centred problem. High Representative 
Borrell has in fact also explicitly referred to China as an 
actor that is attempting to influence EU foreign audiences 
through spinning and the politics of generosity (Borrell, 
2020b). At the same time, EUvsDisinfo’s work remains 
heavily Russia-centred, and the activity of the East 
StratCom Task Force dwarfs that of the other Task Forces. 
Amidst COVID-19, Chinese self-promotion has received 
real attention for the first time, with the publication of an 
EEAS special report on conspiracy narratives and 
disinformation coming from sources related to various 
governments, including Russia and – to a lesser extent – 
China. Allegations that China sought to block or tone down 
the report were denied by EU authorities. The quarrel, 
however, highlighted the difficulty of developing EU 
strategic communication that goes beyond Russia’s 
disinformation attempts.  
Fake news or unwelcome opinions?  
While recognising competition in the international system 
is the first step in dealing with a contested world, at 
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contestation and resorts instead to a polarisation that 
separates neatly between ‘facts’ certified by the EU and 
‘fakes’ fabricated by its antagonists. The welcoming words 
of Borrell’s blog subscribe to this neat separation: the HR 
cautions against the relativism of the Spanish philosopher 
de Campoamor, “claiming in a famous poem that nothing 
is true or false and that everything depends on ‘the colour 
of your glasses’” (Borrell, 2021). In a similar vein, EU 
strategic communication relies on the idea that ‘facts’ 
always speak for themselves, although it neglects to 
recognise that disputing ‘facts’ is part of any political 
process.  
EUvsDisinfo, the EEAS East StratCom Task Force’s flagship 
project, is a good case in point for illustrating this stance. 
An example is offered in a report published on 26 April 
2020. Facing allegations from Rossia 24, a Russian state-
owned channel, that Western values have collapsed 
amidst the pandemic, the website provides a “disproof” 
saying that “the European Union is focused on overcoming 
the COVID-19 pandemic, it remains committed to its 
values, including human dignity” (EUvsDisinfo, 2020). In a 
more recent case, EUvsDisinfo opposes a critical outlook 
on the approval of new EU sanctions, with the expert 
claiming that these are “a political decision that are made 
to punish those who do not comply with the rules of the 
game” (EUvsDisinfo, 2021). These and other cases 
underscore that EUvsDisinfo reports do not primarily 
highlight renowned conspiracy theories or manipulations 
of figures but rather negative opinions of the EU. These 
opinions, as noxious and tedious as they may sound, are 
however perfectly legitimate and require no ‘disproof’. 
The EU’s internal public sphere, not a disinformation 
report, is the appropriate place to disarticulate them and 
build consensus around the achievements of the EU. 
The risks of ‘messaging’ 
The EU’s solution for navigating the troubled waters of a 
complex world strives to be a pragmatic one: in the words 
of Borrell, “Europeans must deal with the world as it is, not 
as they wish it to be” (Borrell, 2020a). At the same time, 
pragmatism finds itself in an uneasy coexistence with the 
emphasis on principles: in the EUGS, for instance, the EU 
engages “to champion the indivisibility and universality of 
human rights” (EU, 2016: 8).  
This pragmatic solution is well-reflected in EU strategic 
communication, where narrative-building and the speed 
of messaging are considered to play primary roles in 
spreading the EU’s positive story. Problematically, 
however, this messaging approach disregards the fact that 
successful people-to-people contacts take place only 
when the principles of mutuality and reciprocity are fully 
reflected in the implementation of external action, in an 
attempt to go beyond power-showcasing and image-
building exercises. Such an approach aimed at mutual 
understanding has informed the development of a 
strategic approach to EU cultural relations, with the most 
recent Council Conclusions on an EU Strategic Approach to 
international cultural relations (2019). 
With the recent emphasis on geopolitics and strategic 
communication the promising ideas around two-way 
communication, notably through cultural exchanges, have 
however been dwarfed. From building policy on mutuality 
and reciprocity and attempting to co-create between 
equals, the EU has moved towards a communication 
approach that considers cultural relations as a tool in the 
above-mentioned EU StratCom’s box, and local actors as 
rather passive recipients of a message that has already 
been drafted in Brussels. 
The ensuing Eurocentrism undermines the very positive 
commitment to an engagement with the world on an 
equal footing. This concerns not only those actors 
contesting the Western-based global order but also 
stakeholders in post-colonial realities, which often 
recognise only a fine line between cooperation and forms 
of neo-colonialism in EU initiatives.  
Rethinking EU strategic communication: 
recommendations 
Even if the EU’s current strategic communication has 
important flaws that this brief has highlighted, one should 
not throw out the baby with the bath water. A renewed 
focus on EU foreign policy and the willingness to 
communicate more strategically are important objectives, 
provided that the temptation to use the language of 
power does not lead Brussels to aggrandise irrelevant 
differences, proclaim the superiority of its model, and 
endanger current and future cooperation. 
First, top-level political communication must change. 
There is no doubt that with the transition from the Juncker 
to the von der Leyen Commission the discourse of key EU 
foreign policy figures has hardened. Compared to his 
predecessor Mogherini, Borrell has significantly 
accentuated the ‘realpolitik’ spirit that had already 
materialised in the European Global Strategy and resorted 
to a tougher securitising vocabulary (‘struggle’, ‘influence’, 
‘armed’, ‘defend’, ‘detractors’), framing the issue in binary 
terms as ‘truth versus spinning’. The reasoning behind this 
turn seems clear: as the EU needs a united approach in 
foreign policy, ’othering’ of this type can help reproduce a 
stable identity within. What can be questioned is not the 
HR’s legitimate objective, but rather the discursive means 
that are used. If anything, the diplomatic turmoil around 
Borrell’s recent visit to Moscow proved that, no matter 
how geopolitical the EU wishes to be, more skilled actors 
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The EU should hence leave securitising practices to illiberal 
actors. 
Second, the EU’s current approach to strategic 
communication over-prioritises foreign interference, 
particularly Russia’s. In the short term, EUvsDisinfo should 
go beyond its Kremlin-centred approach and offer a wider 
analysis of existing disinformation actors. Amidst the 
COVID-19 crisis, China’s rise and engagement with EU 
audiences remain under-explored. Since other spaces of 
contestation have opened across Europe (such as the 
Eastern Mediterranean), a comprehensive reflection on 
the EU’s major competitors should also find its 
repercussions in the EU’s strategic communication.  
Importantly, the EU should limit itself to deconstructing 
arguments without playing the blame game. While there 
is no doubt that Russia has repeatedly violated democratic 
principles and international law, fact-checking should 
simply stick to misleading arguments and show their 
inconsistencies. Rather than providing a political response, 
fact-checking should be about checking facts. The political 
debate must be left to other means of exchange within the 
EU’s internal public sphere.  
Third, and in the long term, a serious reflection on 
disinformation as ‘foreign interference’ should be 
advanced. Disinformation is definitely not a threat that is 
only located far away from EU borders. Many problematic 
positions and narratives have been nurtured in EU 
countries, including for instance Orban’s “logical 
connection” between the pandemic and illegal migration 
(cited in France24, 2020). Perhaps worse, sometimes ‘fake 
news’ emerging from social media can reach high coverage 
through sensational headlines and framing by mainstream 
news media. Overall, a neat distinction between ‘domestic 
heroes’ and ‘foreign villains’ can represent a politically 
handy narrative, but it disguises the real causes of the 
problem. The current mandate of fighting disinformation 
given to an actor with a foreign affairs portfolio, the EEAS, 
confirms this problematic separation between domestic 
and external dimensions. In the long term, a holistic and 
joined-up approach to disinformation should be the way 
to go. 
Finally, a broader reflection is needed on whether 
‘messaging’ is the right strategy to engage with foreign 
audiences. In a world where EU narratives are increasingly 
contested and Eurocentrism is called into question (e.g., 
calls to decolonise cultural heritage), shifting the focus to 
‘listening’ practices will be a more fruitful long-term 
strategy for engaging with other actors in the international 
arena. The 2019 Council Conclusions on an EU strategic 
approach to international cultural relations stressed the 
need for “a new spirit of dialogue, mutual understanding 
and learning”, involving the cooperation with local 
operators at all levels (planning, design, implementation), 
and called for “a decentralised approach, requiring policies 
and projects adapted to local context, needs and 
aspirations” (Council, 2019: 7). As part of the measures 
proposed, international cultural relations – a truly two-
way approach that the EU has repeatedly pledged to 
implement in its external relations – remains the most 
suitable toolbox to shift the focus away from messaging to 
listening, with the objective of engaging with the world on 
an equal footing. 
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